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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendantf Wade Wagstaff, was charged with Burglary, a 
second degree felony and Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 and 76-5-102(1)(a)(1978). 
Defendant was tried in absentia on June 30, 1987. (R. 71). 
Defendant filed a motion for .Arrest of Judgment and for New Trial 
on February 26, 1988. (R. 78). The Motion was denied March 24, 
1988, and defendant was sentenced May 9, 1988. (R. 101, 111, 
120). The Notice of Appeal was filed May 18, 1988. (R. 123). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with Burglary, a second degree 
felony, and Assault, a class B misdemeanor, after defendant 
attempted to confront one of two Muncey brothers regarding 
defendant's believed observation of the brother with defendant's 
wife (T. 34). The assault occurred after defendant and Timothy 
Schaeffer forcefully entered Muncey's dwelling (T„ 36, 37). 
Trial was set Sept€*mber 24 and 25, 1986, but was 
continued on the Ex Parte Motion of the State (R. 36-38). Trial 
was reset for March 25 and 26, 1987, to which defendant's 
attorney objected because of a conflict on his calendar (R. 42, 
43). On March 13, 1987, defendant's attorney filed a Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel because of lack of contact with defendant (R. 
44). The court granted the motion on May 4, 1987, after a 
hearing (R. 52). Previously, on March 18, 1987, the court had 
set a new trial date for June 30 through July 1, 1987. (R. 49). 
On June 19, 1987, the co-defendant filed a Motion to 
Sever which was granted (R. 53-54). Defendant's trial proceeded 
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the right to be piesent in the courtroom at every stage of the 
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voluntarily absent at the time of trial. When defendant fled 
from Utah to avoid threats, and chose not to maintain contact 
with his parole officer or his attorney, he effectively waived 
the right to be present at his trial. The State properly served 
notice, and in no way prevented defendant from attending the 




DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY ABSENTED HIMSELF FROM 
TRIAL WHEN HE FLED THE JURISDICTION AND 
FAILED TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION WITH HIS 
ATTORNEY AND/OR THE COURT, THUS PRECLUDING A 
NEW TRIAL ON THE CONVICTIONS OF BURGLARY AND 
ASSAULT. 
Every defendant has a constitutional right to be 
present in the courtroom at every stage of trial. Constitution 
of Utah, art.I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-1-6, 77-35-17 (Supp. 
1988). This right, however, is not absolute and can be lost or 
waived. State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986). In 
establishing such waiver, it is the State's responsibility to 
show that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
defendant voluntarily absented himself from the trial. Idi. at 
678; State v. Washington, 661 P.2d 605 (Wash. App. 1983). 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17(a)(2)(Supp. 1988) states 
that voluntary absence after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial, does not prevent the trial from preceeding. Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that: 
(b) Whenever service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented 
by an attorney, the service shall be made 
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upon the attorney, unless service upon the 
party himself is ordered by the court. 
Service upon the attorney or upon a party 
shall be made in the manner provided in civil 
actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-32(b)(1982). Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure further clarifies that service to an attorney or 
his client "shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by 
mailing it to him at his known address . . . " Utah R. Civ. P. 
5(b)(1). This rule also specifies that: 
Delivery of a copy within this rule means: 
Handing it to the attorney or to the party; 
or leaving it at his office with his clerk or 
other person in charge therein; or, if there 
is no one in charge, leaving it in a 
conspicuous place therein; or if the office 
is closed or the person to be served has no 
office, leaving it at his dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein. Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing. 
The record in this case indicates that a notice of the 
trial setting was sent to defendant by defendant's attorney on 
March 19, 1987 (T. 4)(Herm Olsen, defendant's attorney at this 
point, was not allowed to withdraw as counsel until May 4, 1987 
(R. 52)). This letter was not returned (T. 4). On April 6, 
1987, defense counsel sent to defendant, at his uncle's address, 
another letter containing the trial date. Defendant and defense 
counsel had had frequent contact with defendant's uncle during 
the course of this matter (T. 4, 6, 7). Mr. Olsen testified 
that, to his knowledge, the uncle's address was the best 
available address at the time (T. 5). This letter was followed 
on April 7, 1987, with another letter containing the trial date, 
which was also sent to the uncle's address (T. 5). Again, on May 
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7, 1987, Mr. Olsen sent another letter indicating the trial date 
to both the uncle's address in Nibley and defendant's last known 
address in Ogden (T. 5). However, the letter sent to the Ogden 
address was returned (T. 5). Defendant voluntarily broke contact 
with his parole officer (T. 14). 
The State notified defendant of the trial date in the 
manner provided by statute and defense counsel notified 
defendant. There is no evidence in the record that defendant 
actually received any of these notices. However, in a similar 
factual situation, where the defendant may not have received 
notice, but had also failed to maintain contact with her 
attorney - thus, effectively preventing herself from the 
reception of notices - the Court of Appeals of Arizona stated: 
It is the responsibility of an out-of-custody 
defendant to remain in contact with his or 
her attorney and with the court. State v. 
Bishop, 139 Ariz. 567, 571, 679 P.2d 1054, 
1058 (1984). The appellant failed to do so 
in this case, and she cannot benefit from her 
misconduct by manipulating a rule designed 
for her protection. See People v. Cortes, 
123 111. App. 3d 816, 820, 463 N.E.2d 885, 
888 (1984). 
State v. Love, 711 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Ariz. App. 1985). In his 
brief, defendant admits the similarity between State v. Love and 
the case at hand, but emphasizes that this decision should not be 
relied upon by the State. (Defendant's brief at 6-7). Defendant 
argues that because his absence was allegedly due to a leak in 
the County Attorney's office concerning a proposed informant 
relationship, the State should not benefit from the voluntary 
absentia rule. This argument might carry more force if there was 
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evidence that the State maliciously acted or suggested that 
defendant flee; but in this instance, when defendant's choice to 
run was his own, as well as his choice not to turn to the police 
or the judicial system - much less his attorney - for assistance, 
defendant's argument that the State "secured" his absence is 
without force. While defendant asserts that his claims of 
impropriety on the part of the State are unrebutted, there is a 
response contained in the record (R. 97-100). The trial court 
found that defendant could have notified law enforcement of his 
alleged danger and accepted the State's position that no 
agreement had ever been reached although one had been discussed 
(R. 101). 
Defendant supports his argument with several examples 
of cases in which the defendant's absence was deemed to be 
involuntary. Each case is clearly distinguishable from the facts 
in the present case. In State v. Coles, 688 P.2d 473 (Utah 
1984), the defendant did not appear because his attorney 
mistakenly informed him that the scheduled trial would not be 
held. In State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986), the 
defendant's absence was deemed to be involuntary because he was 
in custody in another jurisdiction at the time of trial. Also, 
in Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720 (Wyo. 1985), the court found 
that the defendant's absence was involuntary when the defendant 
had suffered a heart attack and was in the hospital at the time. 
Obviously, defendant in the instant case was neither misinformed, 
incarcerated, or hospitalized at the time of trial. In no way 
was defendant's access to the court prohibited. Additionally, in 
defendant's contention that he was unaware of the trial date, it 
seems irrational to even suggest that the State should have 
allowed the case to remain status quo indefinitely - or until 
defendant chose to renew contact. 
The constitutional right to appear at trial is a 
protection for defendants. It should not be allowed to descend 
to a mere tactical ploy. Were the court to allow defendant a new 
trial because he fled the jurisdiction after an alleged threat 
connected to a leak in the County Attorney's office, withdraw all 
communication with his attorney and the judicial system, and then 
return at his leisure - if at all - expecting all to have 
remained the same. This might encourage clever defendants to 
avoid conviction simply by avoiding the courts for any number of 
reasons. Such a practice is an affront to the judicial system. 
Defendant contends that the proper procedure would have 
been to continue the trial until he could be located. Section 
77-35-17(a)(2) provides the correct procedure and allows the case 
to proceed in the event of a defendant's voluntary absence. In 
this case, it was defendant's voluntary decision to leave the 
State. It was also his choice to discontinue all communication 
with his attorney, his parole officer and the court. Notice was 
sent to defendant according to statutory mandates. Defendant was 
not coerced to remain in hiding nor prohibited from returning by 
the State. Accordingly, defendant's absence was voluntary, and 
his request for a new trial was properly denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the decision of the trial court and 
uphold the conviction of Burglary, a second degree felony, and 
Assault, a class B misdemeanor. 
DATED this /$f day of CK^/7)£&€ 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
•SANDRA L. s j o e w ^ 
Assistant ft€torney General 
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I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to Nathan Hult, P.O. 
Box 171, 326 North 100 East, Logan, Utah 84321, this /&t day of 
November, 1988. 
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